Putin estimates shipping strike damage at 1% of GDP amid Russian grain export problems

Russian President Vladimir Putin estimated the damage to Russia from Ukrainian strikes on shipping in the Black and Azov seas at around 1% of GDP. According to him, about 100 vessels were damaged during a 40-day campaign. Putin acknowledged that Ukrainian drones pose a real threat and said the strikes had caused “real” damage to Russia, but described it as not critical and insisted that Russia was capable of dealing with the threat.

However, Putin did not explain the methodology behind the 1% of GDP estimate or specify what it includes. It remains unclear whether the figure covers only direct damage to vessels and infrastructure or also accounts for port disruptions, lost exports, higher logistics costs and the broader impact on economic activity. Therefore, translating the stated 1% of GDP into a specific amount of direct losses would be misleading at this stage.

The impact of the Ukrainian strikes is already particularly visible in Russia’s grain export logistics. In 2025/26 MY, Russia exported 46.3 mln tons of grain through its Black Sea and Azov Sea ports, accounting for around 90% of seaborne shipments. Problems along the traditional export corridor are forcing Russian exporters to redirect some cargoes through the Baltic and Caspian seas, while increased shipments via Far Eastern ports and overland routes are also being considered. However, these alternatives have limited capacity, while longer transport distances significantly increase grain delivery costs. Concentrating cargo flows on alternative routes could also create additional risks if the geographical scope of Ukrainian strikes expands further.

Shipping disruptions have already affected the pace of Russian grain exports. Wheat shipments in August were estimated at only around 1.8 mln tons, 2.5 times lower than a year earlier and the lowest August volume since 2010. Limited export capacity amid a large harvest is increasing grain availability on the domestic market and putting additional pressure on procurement prices.

Alternative routes are also considerably more expensive. Redirecting grain through the Baltic adds around $40–50/t to logistics costs, while transportation via the Caspian has also become more expensive. Far Eastern ports could provide additional access to Asian markets, but their distance from Russia’s main grain-producing regions means they cannot quickly replace Black Sea ports for the bulk of Russian exports.

Putin’s estimate of damage equivalent to 1% of GDP therefore remains a figure without a disclosed methodology. For the grain sector, however, the consequences are already tangible: lower exports, pressure on domestic prices, rising logistics costs and the need to redirect millions of tons of grain from the Black Sea to longer and less efficient routes.

Tags: Black Sea grain corridor, Russia, export, grain, Black Sea region, ports, war