How the “Russian grain trap” undermines political stability in Africa

Dependence on Russian wheat is associated with political risks in African countries, while Ukrainian grain does not produce the same effect. The key factor is not imports themselves, but the concentration of supply and its volatility. This is stated in the article “The Russian Grain Trap” prepared by researchers from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) and the Free University of Berlin.

The authors analyzed data from 35 countries between 2005 and 2024 and concluded that the key driver is not grain imports per se, but the structure of dependence on suppliers.

How did import structure change after 2022?

Over the past two decades, Russia and Ukraine supplied basic agricultural commodities to African countries. Between 2005–2007 and 2019–2021, Russia increased its share of Africa’s total wheat imports from 13% to 24%. Ukraine also grew its share from 5% to 16%.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 dramatically changed the situation. Russia actively sought to capture the wheat market share lost by Ukraine due to port blockades and attacks on agricultural infrastructure.

As a result, Russia’s share of Africa’s wheat market rose to 32% after the invasion, while Ukraine’s share dropped to 8%.

How does Russian wheat affect political stability?

The study shows that dependence on Russian wheat does not directly change political regimes but gradually undermines stability.

Since 2014, Russian exports have experienced moderate but regular disruptions of around 2% annually. While not enough to trigger food crises, they created chronic uncertainty: states had to spend more on imports, manage price volatility, and balance budgets.

When this period is included in models, dependence on Russian wheat becomes statistically significant and negatively correlated with stability. This means political risks accumulated over years, not only after 2022.

The full-scale war acted as a trigger, amplifying the effect: sudden supply disruptions and export volatility increased fiscal pressure and intensified internal resource distribution conflicts. In some countries, this was accompanied by rising undernourishment.

At the same time, Russia engaged in so-called “grain diplomacy.”

“A striking example of this geopolitical strategy was Russia’s provision of 200,000 tons of free grain to six African countries (Somalia, Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea). In exchange for such agricultural subsidies, Russia seeks to influence African voting in the United Nations on resolutions condemning its invasion of Ukraine,” the study notes.

However, the success of this strategy is not guaranteed due to domestic factors in African countries, such as regime type and institutional capacity.

What does Ukrainian wheat show?

The growth of Ukrainian wheat exports to Africa was more moderate. Its average market share increased from about 9% in 2005–2013 to around 13% in 2014–2021.

After the start of the full-scale war and the blockade of Black Sea ports in 2022, this share fell to about 6% in 2022–2024.

The earlier growth in 2014–2021 was mainly driven by established pre-2014 markets, including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Mauritania.

Ukraine found it harder to expand into new markets due to competition from Russian wheat exports.

Unlike Russian wheat, dependence on Ukrainian grain has no statistically significant impact on political stability, undernourishment, or democratic institutions.

This indicates that grain imports from the Black Sea region are not inherently risky — the key factor is supplier concentration and volatility.

Conclusion

Figure 4 shows heterogeneous relationships between food security, democracy, and political stability in African countries, as well as their dependence on wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia. For example, undernourishment and democracy indices show only weak links with Black Sea wheat imports, while political stability is clearly correlated with dependence on Russian wheat.

“Overall, the baseline results form the foundation of the ‘Russian grain trap’ concept. Concentration of Russian wheat imports does not systematically affect regime type, but it leads to significant socio-economic and political costs when export flows are disrupted. Dependence on Ukrainian wheat shows no statistically significant effects. This asymmetry is the central element of the analysis,” the researchers concluded.

They added that Africa’s vulnerability does not stem from general dependence on the Black Sea region, but from concentrated reliance on Russian agricultural exports.

Tags: Africa, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, grain