Eight factors that will influence grain prices until 2030 — expert opinion

The wheat and corn market is entering one of the most volatile periods in decades. This assessment comes from grain broker Dmitry Verlan, who has 14 years of experience in the Black Sea and Mediterranean markets.

Previous crises — the 2007–2008 global food crisis, the 2010 supply disruptions, and the 2012 US drought — were mostly single-factor shocks such as harvest failures, oil price spikes, or short-term financial panic. Today, at least eight structural factors are simultaneously pressuring the global grain market.

These include:

• the ongoing armed conflict in the Black Sea region;
• geopolitical fragmentation of trade flows;
• high cost of capital and fertilizers;
• restructuring of logistics routes;
• long-term degradation of Ukraine’s production capacity.

No previous cycle has combined all these challenges at once — which makes the current situation fundamentally different.

Wheat and corn, together accounting for more than 40% of global calorie consumption, now sit at the intersection of geopolitical conflicts, climate risks, and structural economic shifts. Traditional pricing logic — seasonality, supply-demand balance, exchange rates — is no longer sufficient.

By 2030, the market will be shaped by at least eight interconnected drivers. Each of them alone can significantly influence global grain markets. Together, they create a new reality in which those who understand the systemic links between politics, energy, logistics, and agriculture will gain the advantage.

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Global grain market challenges: how brokers navigate crises and what will define trade

Geopolitical and military instability

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a turning point for global grain markets. For the first time in decades, armed conflict affected two key players simultaneously: Ukraine — one of the largest exporters of corn and wheat — and Russia, which has expanded its agricultural export capacity under sanctions and isolation.

The market no longer treats the war as a temporary shock. It has become a structural pricing factor. The Black Sea Grain Initiative (August 2022–July 2023) partially restored Ukrainian exports, but after its termination volumes declined: USDA data shows Ukrainian grain exports in 2023/24 fell by 27% year-on-year and by 28% versus the pre-war five-year average. In 2024/25, production declined due to drought and EU restrictions. In 2025/26, a further sharp drop is observed.

Russia, meanwhile, benefited from the situation: in 2023/24 it reached a record wheat export of 51 million tons. In 2024/25 exports declined to 41.5–42.2 million tons due to stock depletion — around 25% below the peak (Rusagrotrans and Agroinvestor estimates).

By 2030, conflict duration and intensity remain the most uncertain market variable.

However, the Black Sea is not the only risk zone:

China–Taiwan: The Taiwan Strait handles 40–50% of global container traffic. Any escalation would sharply increase freight and insurance costs and disrupt grain flows into Asia and Oceania.

US–Latin America: Increased US sanctions pressure in the Caribbean affects logistics routes and accelerates trade realignment toward non-Western suppliers.

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Iran: Hormuz Strait, oil, fertilizers, and grain

Iran rarely appears as a direct grain-market factor — but this is misleading. Its influence is indirect yet systemic, operating through oil markets, fertilizers, and wheat imports.

The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. According to EIA and Statista, around 20.3 million barrels of oil and petroleum products pass through it daily (2024), roughly one-fifth of global consumption and more than a quarter of seaborne trade. There is no viable alternative route. Any escalation immediately raises fuel and logistics costs, directly affecting grain production and transport.

The second channel is fertilizers. Gulf countries, including Iran, are major nitrogen fertilizer producers. Sanctions restrict official flows, but trade via third countries continues. Any escalation in the region threatens fertilizer supply to Asia and Africa. This mechanism was evident in spring 2026, when urea prices surged to $826/t — the highest since late 2022.

The third channel is Iran as a wheat importer. Domestic production is declining: USDA estimates 2024/25 output at 13.5 million tons versus 16 million tons a year earlier. With consumption at 16.95 million tons, the structural deficit of 3.45 million tons is covered by imports. Between April and October 2025, Iran imported 1.125 million tons of wheat worth $424 million. In May 2025, it became the largest buyer of Russian wheat with 342,000 tons. Such irregular large-scale demand increases global price volatility.

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US, China, and the EU: tariff wars and a new trade map

The renewed US–China trade confrontation in 2025 demonstrated that grain markets are highly sensitive to decisions made in negotiation rooms rather than in fields. However, this is only part of a broader shift, as the EU simultaneously shapes global trade flows.

In February 2025, China imposed an additional 10% tariff on US soybeans. As a result, US exports to China fell to 7.4 million tons — 72% lower than in 2024.

From May to November 2025, China effectively halted US soybean purchases. Later, a Trump–Xi agreement set commitments for 12 million tons in late 2025 and 25 million tons annually in 2026–2028. However, this illustrates a key trend: trade flows are increasingly politically, not market, driven.

China continues diversifying suppliers, with Brazil and Argentina gaining share. If tensions persist, the US will lose market share and face stronger competition from Ukraine and the EU.

The EU acts as a dual player: both a regulator and a buyer. After farmer protests in 2024, it reinstated quotas on Ukrainian grain. In early 2025/26, EU imports from Ukraine fell by 57.7%. In parallel, the EU–US framework agreement in July 2025 granted preferential access to US agricultural goods, increasing competition.

Thus, the grain trade map is shaped not by bilateral US–China relations, but by a triangular US–China–EU dynamic.

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Global inflation and credit pressure

High capital costs remain an under-discussed but critical factor. Interest rate hikes in 2022–2024 significantly increased global agricultural financing costs.

Developing countries face rising debt burdens and reduced foreign reserves, limiting grain imports and suppressing global demand. This puts downward pressure on FOB prices and increases volatility. Monetary policy will remain a structural source of instability through 2030.

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Fertilizers and gas: structural cost inflation

After the 2022 price shock, fertilizer markets did not return to pre-crisis levels. In 2025–2026, prices rose again. Urea stood at $801/t in March 2022 versus $245/t in 2020. After correction, prices climbed again: $416/t in October 2025 (US) and $422/t in South America. By April 2026, they reached $826/t in the US and $725/t globally — a four-year high.

The main driver is escalation in the Hormuz region, higher gas prices, and constrained supply from the Gulf.

According to the World Bank (Commodity Markets Outlook, April 2026), urea prices may rise another 60% in 2026, potentially exceeding $700/t, the second-highest level since 1974. A 25% correction is expected in 2027 if supply recovers.

FAO warns that reduced fertilizer use will lower yields within 6–9 months. Fertilizers remain a core cost component through 2030.

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Freight and logistics: a new geography of supply

Freight has become a stress indicator of the global system. Since 2022, Black Sea risk has been permanently embedded in insurance premiums, reducing Ukraine’s competitiveness versus Argentina and Australia.

At the same time, new logistics routes are emerging: Danube ports, Poland and Romania corridors, and rail crossings. These are more expensive and slower but have become permanent and will persist through 2030.

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Degradation of Ukrainian farmland

Ukraine’s agricultural capacity decline is a long-term structural issue.

USDA/IFPRI data shows:

• wheat area down 32%;
• corn down 27%;
• barley down 37%;
• total area across six major crops down 19.5%.

Before the war, corn production doubled from 21 million tons (2012/13) to 42 million tons (2021/22). Today, recovery is constrained by:

• 10–15 million hectares of mined land;
• destroyed infrastructure;
• labor outflow.

Full recovery will take at least 5–10 years.

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Ukraine: loss of markets and recovery struggle

Before 2022, Ukraine ranked among the top five wheat exporters and sixth in corn exports. Key markets included Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

After 2022, these markets shifted to Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Australia due to logistics and war-related risks.

The Danube and maritime corridors proved viable, and EU integration and bilateral agreements are gradually restoring trade.

However, returning to pre-war export levels and geography before 2030 is unlikely without sustained peace and infrastructure recovery.

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Conclusion: a market that no longer forgives ignorance

The wheat and corn market toward 2030 is characterized by structurally elevated risk. Traditional tools — seasonality, weather models, USDA reports — remain necessary but insufficient.

Politics, energy, logistics, and infrastructure are now equal drivers of price formation.

Market participants who integrate these eight factors into strategic decision-making will gain a competitive advantage regardless of their position in the trade chain.

Tags: corn, grain, prices, wheat